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INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

In 1938, the passage of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) established
discovery practice. Discovery was idealistically intended to be a cooperative and selfregulating process that would function largely free from judicial intervention.1 But
modern electronic-discovery (e-discovery) practice has strayed from these cooperative
ideals, and discovery has instead come to rely on judicial intervention. Due to recent
technological advances that were unforeseen when the FRCP were amended in 2006—
such as predictive coding, metadata, and shadow copies—the FRCP cannot properly
govern modern e-discovery. E-discovery practice’s status quo is plainly ineffective—it is
hugely burdensome and expensive, and is an obstacle rather than a tool. E-discovery’s
issues must be confronted head-on.
Many have requested that the Advisory Committee on the Rules of Civil Procedure
(Advisory Committee) amend the FRCP in order to remedy these issues.2 In response, the
Advisory Committee is currently discussing the idea of limiting evidence spoliation by

*

J.D., 2014, Northwestern University School of Law.
See John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery’s Fatal Flaws, 84 MINN. L. REV. 505, 513
(2000).
2
See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY
COMMITTEE 274 (2011) [hereinafter COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE REPORT], available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Standing/ST2011-06.pdf.
1
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adding a data-preservation duty on potential litigants.3 But recent technological advances
and judicial activity render this proposal insufficient—the FRCP must be amended to
recognize that e-discovery will perpetually present novel threats. E-discovery’s modern
threats require constant judicial intervention, so to maintain discovery’s cooperative spirit
towards fact-finding, the court must be brought in at litigation’s earliest stages.
This Comment proposes that the Rule 26(f) discovery conference4 be amended to
bring the court in at the earliest stage of discovery. Amending Rule 26(f) in this way
recognizes that e-discovery is perpetually evolving, and would create a versatile
3
See id. (discussing preservation duty); Millberg LLP & Hausfeld LLP, E-Discovery Today: The Fault
Lies Not in Our Rules . . . , 4 FED. CTS. L. REV. 131, 188–92 (2010–11), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Duke%20Materials/Library/Milberg%20LLP,%2
0Hausfeld%20LLP,%20E-Discovery%20Today.pdf.
4
In its entirety, Rule 26(f) reads as follows:

(f) Conference of the Parties; Planning for Discovery.
(1) Conference Timing. Except in a proceeding exempted from initial disclosure
under Rule 26(a)(1)(B) or when the court orders otherwise, the parties must confer as
soon as practicable—and in any event at least 21 days before a scheduling conference is
to be held or a scheduling order is due under Rule 16(b).
(2) Conference Content; Parties’ Responsibilities. In conferring, the parties must consider
the nature and basis of their claims and defenses and the possibilities for promptly
settling or resolving the case; make or arrange for the disclosures required by Rule
26(a)(1); discuss any issues about preserving discoverable information; and develop a
proposed discovery plan. The attorneys of record and all unrepresented parties that have
appeared in the case are jointly responsible for arranging the conference, for attempting
in good faith to agree on the proposed discovery plan, and for submitting to the court
within 14 days after the conference a written report outlining the plan. The court may
order the parties or attorneys to attend the conference in person.
(3) Discovery Plan. A discovery plan must state the parties’ views and proposals on:
(A) what changes should be made in the timing, form, or requirement for disclosures
under Rule 26(a), including a statement of when initial disclosures were made or will be
made;
(B) the subjects on which discovery may be needed, when discovery should be
completed, and whether discovery should be conducted in phases or be limited to or
focused on particular issues;
(C) any issues about disclosure or discovery of electronically stored information,
including the form or forms in which it should be produced;
(D) any issues about claims of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation materials,
including—if the parties agree on a procedure to assert these claims after production—
whether to ask the court to include their agreement in an order;
(E) what changes should be made in the limitations on discovery imposed under these
rules or by local rule, and what other limitations should be imposed; and
(F) any other orders that the court should issue under Rule 26(c) or under Rule 16(b) and
(c).
(4) Expedited Schedule. If necessary to comply with its expedited schedule for Rule
16(b) conferences, a court may by local rule:
(A) require the parties’ conference to occur less than 21 days before the scheduling
conference is held or a scheduling order is due under Rule 16(b); and
(B) require the written report outlining the discovery plan to be filed less than 14 days
after the parties’ conference, or excuse the parties from submitting a written report and
permit them to report orally on their discovery plan at the Rule 16(b) conference.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f).
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discovery system that can efficiently react to novel issues that will inevitably arise. Part I
of this Comment discusses the FRCP’s current e-discovery framework and the
mechanical evolution of the Rule 26(f) conference. Part II gives an overview and
evaluation of the current dialogue on whether the FRCP should be amended in light of
modern e-discovery law’s shortcomings. Part III considers three contemporary
developments in the e-discovery landscape—predictive coding, metadata, and shadow
copies—and gives light to the FRCP’s current failures in effectively managing ediscovery. Part IV proposes an amendment to the Rule 26(f) discovery conference, which
would give the court an active managerial role at this early litigation stage. Finally, Part
V demonstrates the benefits of this proposed amendment by applying it to a current
issue—the federal circuit split on which costs relating to the production of electronically
stored information (ESI) are recoverable by the prevailing party.
I. E-DISCOVERY UNDER THE FRCP
¶4

¶5

¶6

Discovery practice has long been a hotbed of controversy and unprofessionalism.5
The FRCP seek to “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action and proceeding.”6 Towards this end, discovery is meant to: (1) take the game out
of pretrial practice while maintaining adversarial trials that focus on potentially
dispositive issues, (2) disclose and make available all relevant evidence for trial, (3)
expose fraudulent or meritless claims, and (4) optimize judicial economy by promoting
just settlements.7 The FRCP’s recent amendments demonstrate that these purposes have
remained static.8
The FRCP enact a two-tiered approach9 for ESI discovery.10 First, Rule 26(b)(2)(C)
imposes a proportionality principal, requiring the judiciary to balance a discovery
request’s potential benefits with the burden of producing the requested discovery.11
Second, Rule 26(b)(2)(B) requires the requesting party to show good cause for its
request.12
Under Rule 26(f), parties must meet and confer with each other in a discovery
planning conference to discuss issues such as: (1) preservation of potentially relevant
records, (2) ESI disclosure and how ESI will be produced, and (3) inadvertently
produced privileged documents.13 The Advisory Committee added this meet-and-confer
5

Paul W. Grimm et al., New Paradigm for Discovery Practice: Cooperation, 43-DEC MD. B.J. 26, 27
(2010).
6
FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
7
Developments in the Law—Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REV. 940, 944–46 (1961).
8
See Burke T. Ward et al., Electronic Discovery: Rules for a Digital Age, 18 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L.
150, 181 (2012), for an overview of electronic discovery. For an analysis of the 2006 amendments, see
Kenneth J. Withers, Electronically Stored Information: The December 2006 Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 171 (2006).
9
See, e.g., Thomas Y. Allman, The “Two-Tiered” Approach to E-Discovery: Has Rule 26(b)(2)(b)
Fulfilled Its Promise?, 14 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 7 (2008); Vlad Vainberg, When Should Discovery Come with
a Bill? Assessing Cost Shifting for Electronic Discovery, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1523, 1557 (2010).
10
See FED. R. CIV. P. 34.
11
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(c).
12
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(b).
13
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f); Moze Cowper & John Rosenthal, Not Your Mother’s Rule 26(f) Conference
Anymore, 8 SEDONA CONF. J. 261, 261–62 (2007) (discussing the role of the discovery conference).
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requirement in 2006 to foster cooperation between parties.14 For all discovery requests,
including ESI, a presumption exists that the responding party bears the cost of
production, but a Rule 26(c) protective order can shift cost allocation.15 Often, attorneys
fail to effectively utilize the conference, or fail to abide by the rule at all.16 These are the
FRCP’s only checks on a plaintiff’s requests for discovery production.
This reinforces the need for parties to cooperate throughout the discovery process.
E-discovery requests regularly call for terabytes of data,17 imposing massive time and
financial costs on the producing party. To limit these costs and ensure an effective
discovery process, litigants must cooperatively and immediately sculpt a discovery plan;
“discovery now pivots on the Rule 26(f) conference.”18
Yet recent scholarship discusses the failure of the 26(f) conference in fulfilling its
intended purpose.19 In light of Rule 26(f)’s shortcomings and the deep uncertainty that
shrouds e-discovery, Rule 37 becomes particularly troublesome. Under Rule 37(e),
“[a]bsent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions . . . on a party for
failing to provide electronically stored information lost as a result of [a] routine, goodfaith” data-retention policy.20 Rule 37(f) allows a court to sanction parties by ordering
payment of reasonable expenses for failing to formulate a discovery plan in good faith
during the 26(f) conference.21 The varied issues and threats this Comment discusses
should be viewed against the discretionary and value standards used when sanctions are
imposed for breaches of the general duty to preserve ESI.
II. UNCERTAINTY SPAWNS DISCUSSION TO AMEND THE FRCP

¶9

Currently, rampant uncertainties in e-discovery law pose great threats. Dataretention requirements vary in each state, and there is no certainty regarding what ESI is
discoverable and which costs of production are recoverable.22 Technological advances
threaten privileged communication, e-discovery requests require substantial manpower,
and litigants attempt to game the process. The modern e-discovery system has been
14

Cowper & Rosenthal, supra note 13, at 261–62.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f); see Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 674 F.3d 158, 170–71
(3d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 233, 233 (2012).
16
Race Tires, 674 F.3d at 170.
17
See Jason R. Baron, Law in the Age of Exabytes: Some Further Thoughts on “Information Inflation”
and Current Issues in E-Discovery Search, 17 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 9, 30 (2011).
18
Steven S. Gensler, Some Thoughts on the Lawyer’s E-Volving Duties in Discovery, 36 N. KY. L. REV.
521, 523 (2009).
19
See, e.g., Scott E. Randolph & A. Dean Bennett, Using the Mandatory Rule 26(f) Discovery
Conference to Manage ESI Pays Dividends Throughout Litigation, 54 ADVOCATE 34 (2011), available at
http://www.employerslawyersblog.com/2011/02/using-the-mandatory-rule-26f-discovery-conference-tomanage-esi-pays-dividends-throughout-litigation.html (discussing the facial insufficiency of Rule 26(f) in
providing attorneys with effective guidance to manage the e-discovery process).
20
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e).
21
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f).
22
See 8 RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2008.2 (3d ed. 2007); see also
Thomas Y. Allman, Conducting E-Discovery After the Amendments: The Second Wave, 10 SEDONA CONF.
J. 215, 227 (2009) (“It has been argued that the 2006 Amendments are not sufficient to adequately address
the rising cost of e-discovery. If this proves to be the case, there may be a need for further amendments to
the Civil Rules of Procedure.”); Survey, Electronic Discovery, 50 STATE STATUTORY SURVEYS (Apr.
2014).
15

358

Vol. 12:4]

Matthew Young

widely scrutinized, and since the 2006 FRCP amendments, scholarship has largely
revolved around the need for enhanced cooperation and proportionality in discovery.23
¶10
Responding to these calls for reform, the Advisory Committee convened the first
formal post-2006 examination of the FRCP’s treatment of e-discovery, the 2010 Civil
Litigation Conference at Duke University (Duke Conference).24 In considering whether
to amend the FRCP, the Duke Conference participants focused on data preservation and
sanctions, and suggested proposing a rule that would
address[] preservation issues, such as what events should trigger
preservation obligations, the scope and duration of the duty to preserve,
litigation holds, the relationship between the work product doctrine and
preservation activities, and the consequences of failures to preserve.
Attendees also called for a nationwide rule establishing uniform standards
for sanctions.25
Further, participants advocated the importance of proportionality in ensuring that litigants
do not abuse discovery by engaging in limitless discovery practice.26 The participants
also believed that Rule 26(d)’s bar on discovery before the conference deserved potential
reconsideration. If “the parties and later the judge have a better idea of what the discovery
issues may be,” parties would be better equipped to independently resolve issues through
the 26(f) conference.27 However, participants apprehensively noted that more active
judicial involvement might have to accompany any rule changes meant to solve ediscovery’s issues.28
¶11
The Advisory Committee continued the e-discovery dialogue in April 2011, but no
steps were made towards resolution. The Advisory Committee stated that they “reached
no conclusion on whether rule amendments would be a productive way of dealing with
preservation/sanctions concerns, much less what amendment proposals would be
useful.”29 The Committee chiefly proposed three potential amendments to resolve ediscovery issues.

23

See generally ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY: LAW AND PRACTICE § 5.08 (2014); David F. Herr & Jolynn
M. Markinson, E-Discovery Under the Minnesota Rules: Where We’ve Been, Where We Might Be Headed,
40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 390 (2014); Andrew J. Peck, John M. Facciola, & Steven Teppler, E-Discovery:
Where We’ve Been, Where We Are, Where We’re Going, 12 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1 (2014).
24
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, 2011 MID-YEAR E-DISCOVERY UPDATE 20 (2011) [hereinafter
GIBSON DUNN 2011 UPDATE], available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2011MidYearE-DiscoveryUpdate.pdf.
25
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, 2010 YEAR-END ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AND INFORMATION LAW
UPDATE 2 (2011) [hereinafter GIBSON DUNN 2010 UPDATE], available at
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2010YearEndE-DiscoveryInformationLawUpdate.pdf; see also COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE REPORT, supra note 2.
See generally THOMAS Y. ALLMAN, PRESERVATION AND SPOLIATION REVISITED: IS IT TIME FOR
ADDITIONAL RULEMAKING? (2010), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Duke%20Materials/Library/Thomas%20Allman,
%20Preservation%20and%20Spoliation%20Revisited.pdf.
26
Millberg LLP & Hausfeld LLP, supra note 3, at 152–53.
27
See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE REPORT, supra note 2, at 308.
28
See GIBSON DUNN 2010 UPDATE, supra note 25.
29
COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE REPORT, supra note 2, at 191.
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First, it considered amending the FRCP to include detailed and specific datapreservation standards that would provide guidance as to the duty to preserve data.30 This
proposal delineated specific events that would trigger the duty to preserve data in
anticipation of litigation. Examples included a person’s receipt of a communication
indicating intent to assert a claim and a person taking specified action in anticipation of
litigation.31 The proposal also included a catchall-triggering standard that would put a
reasonable person on notice of her need to preserve data.32 By focusing on a party’s
actual and constructive knowledge, this change would effectively maintain the current
reasonableness-triggering standard while creating some clarity on the preservation duty.
¶13
Second, the Advisory Committee considered creating general preservation rules by
inserting a general duty to preserve triggered by a generalized-reasonableness standard
under Rule 26.33 Under this proposal, the preservation duty would be triggered when a
person should reasonably expect to be a party to a legal action,34 and covers the ESI one
would reasonably believe to be relevant to the anticipated legal action conditioned upon
the Rule 26(b)(2)(C) proportionality criteria.35 This proposal attempts to be more
adaptable, with an eye towards the dynamic qualities of the e-discovery landscape, but
adds very little substance in comparison to the first proposal’s catchall provision.36
¶14
Finally, the Advisory Committee’s third contemplated proposal introduces “back
end” sanctions for Rule 37(b),37 while adding no specific directives regarding the duty to
preserve.38 This amendment would seek to indirectly regulate preservation by requiring
that parties act reasonably in making preservation decisions.39 In other words, a party that
does not reasonably preserve data would face sanctions.40
¶15
The Advisory Committee’s focus on preservation and sanction issues was far too
narrow—all three proposals are inadequate. Each proposal ignores the fundamental
threats that arise when using e-discovery, namely, the enormous time and financial
burdens, inadvertent breaches of confidentiality, and litigants’ propensity to game the
discovery process. Due to its narrow focus, the Advisory Committee overlooked the fact
that large corporations currently employ conservative ESI-retention policies due to fears
of sanctions, which courts have imposed more frequently each year.41 These proposals
overlook e-discovery’s macro-threats, and fail to confront the uncertainty underlying ESI
discoverability.
30

Id. at 192.
See id. at 192–95.
32
Id. at 195.
33
Id. at 208.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 209.
36
It is possible that there may be a difference in party expectations between the two proposals: the first
proposal may in practice limit expectations to those categories whereas the second may create notice of a
generalized duty to preserve. But substantively, under both proposed changes, a court would focus on
someone’s actual or constructive knowledge of pending litigation, and conduct a fact-based inquiry to
determine whether someone breached the preservation duty.
37
COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE REPORT, supra note 2, at 212.
38
Id. at 190.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 212.
41
See Dan H. Willoughby, Jr. et al., Sanctions for E-Discovery Violations: By the Numbers, 60 DUKE
L.J. 789 (2010).
31
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The shortcomings of these proposals are even more apparent under individual
scrutiny. The first proposal’s catchall effectively imposes a reasonableness standard on
the duty to preserve data, which in practice would change nothing. Additionally, its
detailed preservation provisions neglect to account for future technological change. Just
as modern e-discovery issues were beyond the contemplation of the Committee in 2006,42
newly created data types will inevitably arise before the next FRCP amendment
opportunity in 2017, and probably even before any amendments will take effect at the
end of 2014.43 The detailed provisions afford litigants legal refuge for disposing of ESI
not explicitly listed. This undermines discovery’s purpose by promoting gamesmanship
tactics and allowing litigants to hide potentially dispositive evidence.
The second proposal also fails to advance meaningful change because the
generalized preservation duty fails to add clarity—it does not alter the current
preservation and triggering standards. The Advisory Committee did not define
“discoverable information,”44 neglecting the enormous uncertainty that underlies what
ESI is discoverable. Also, a defendant’s independent proportionality calculation
inappropriately limits the preservation duty. This undercuts the judiciary’s authority to
apply the Rule 26(b)(2)(C) proportionality requirement, and leaves open the possibility
that a litigant may also be sanctioned for incorrectly deleting ESI on these grounds. As
new ESI forms emerge—some of which may be unknown to litigants—this preservation
duty affords litigants far too much power in sculpting their duty to preserve.
It is also worth noting that the Advisory Committee recognizes that it may lack
authority to impose preservation standards under the Rules Enabling Act.45 These two
proposals are therefore not only insufficient in substance, but also offer little-to-no
promise for any textual changes to the FRCP in the near future.
The third “back end” sanctions proposal also ignores e-discovery’s pressing issues.
It instructs courts to make decisions regarding sanctions using a reasonableness standard,
and offers a nonexclusive list of factors relevant to reasonableness.46 Not only does this
proposal fail due to its narrow focus, it also ignores the substantial deterrent effect that
sanctions provide. The proposal fails to address the unsettled ESI-discoverability
standards, and does not alter the judicial-reasonableness standard for breach of the duty to
preserve. None of these three proposals has been accepted, yet they remain the most
formalized proposals to date.
During a November 23, 2011 conference call, the Advisory Committee disregarded
a preservation rule and began favoring a sanctions rule.47 The Advisory Committee
maintained this focus on a January 26, 2012 call, and debated whether a sanctions rule

42

For instance, cloud data storage has since emerged as a major issue.
See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE REPORT, supra note 2, at 192 (noting that
amendments will not be effective until the end of 2014, and that new rules cannot be amended for three
years).
44
Id. at 209.
45
See id. at 31.
46
See id. at 213.
47
See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES REPORT 249–50
(2012) [hereinafter ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES REPORT], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Civil/CV2012-03.pdf ((discussing sanctions/
preservation issues).
43
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should distinguish ESI preservation from evidentiary preservation, generally.48 This topic
was also the focus of a formal committee meeting in March 2012.49 The Advisory
Committee mentioned the possibility of making rough amendments to other Rules,50 yet
was noncommittal in doing so, and remained explicitly focused on preservation issues.51
Some of these potential amendments are promising.52 Although the Advisory
Committee’s brief discussion on proportionality’s importance in discovery is optimistic,53
analysis of any non-sanction-based amendment is nascent and underdeveloped. These
ancillary discussions appear to be more of an exercise in intellectual diligence than a
legitimate topic for FRCP amendments. Considering the Committee’s streamlined
focus,54 it is hard to see how any non-Rule 37 amendments can be reasonably anticipated.
Respectfully, those with the power to effectuate meaningful change are off the mark, and
must begin to consider e-discovery’s broader issues.
III. A SLIGHT PARADIGM SHIFT REVEALED
¶21

Discovery practice must return to its collaborative and justice-seeking goals, from
which e-discovery has retreated. E-discovery often requires the production of terabytes55
of data, which imposes huge costs on the producing party, and threatens both strike
suits56 and Pyrrhic victories.57 These costs cannot be ignored.
¶22
Scholars that advocate for amending the FRCP have come to a consensus that
cooperation and an enhanced proportionality requirement will yield efficient discovery
practice.58 Both are crucial: cooperation underlies successful discovery practice and
proportionality works to prevent abusive discovery requests. These positions, however,
divorce the litigant’s actions from judicial activity. Bolstering just these ideals may
mitigate e-discovery’s costs, but would accomplish little more. Complete cooperation and
collaboration are idealistic notions that the FRCP have consistently failed to attain.
Proportionality alone is insufficient as well. This standard is vague, and, even if it were

48

Id.
Id. at 250–51.
50
See id. at 371–417.
51
Id. at 375.
52
See id. at 380 (suggesting holding a conference with a court before filing a discovery motion); id. at
390 (suggesting that Rule 1 should include a provision that “parties should cooperate” to achieve “just,
speedy, and inexpensive” resolution).
53
See id. at 388–89.
54
All potential amendments are separated within the publication and noted as “sketches,” not proposals.
In fact, these discussions seem reactionary to public complaints. See, e.g., id. at 388 (“[L]aments are often
heard that although discovery in most cases is conducted in reasonable proportion to the nature of the case,
discovery runs out of control in an important fraction of all cases.”).
55
One terabyte equals 1000 gigabytes, or one trillion bytes. See, e.g., Ben Kerschberg, 200 Terabytes of
Government E-Discovery Abuse, FORBES (Apr. 20, 2011, 8:50 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/benkerschberg/2011/04/20/200-terabytes-of-government-e-discovery-abuse/.
56
See AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION MEMBER SURVEY ON CIVIL PRACTICE: FULL
REPORT 68 (2009) [hereinafter ABA REPORT] (noting that almost 80% of defense attorneys and about 75%
of mixed-practice attorneys that responded to the survey believe that discovery is commonly used to force
settlement).
57
For an overview of this issue, see Scott A. Moss, Litigation Discovery Cannot Be Optimal but Could
Be Better: The Economics of Improving Discovery Timing in a Digital Age, 58 DUKE L.J. 889, 901 (2009).
58
See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES REPORT, supra note 47 and accompanying text.
49
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more specific, courts are not applying it often enough.59 Proportionality alone does not
contain costs, and must be discussed at a case’s outset to have any effectiveness.60
¶23
Aside from sky-high costs and uncertain preservation requirements, modern ediscovery imposes a host of additional threats. There is unpredictability in what ESI is
currently discoverable and what discovery production costs are recoverable. There is also
a risk that parties may inadvertently release confidential and privileged information.
Coupled with litigants’ propensity for gaming the system, all of these aspects of modern
e-discovery threaten judicial economy. An examination of the mechanisms that guide
three modern developments in ESI—predictive coding, metadata, and shadow copies—
highlights these threats in practice.
¶24
The effects of these three developments illustrate why the judiciary must assume a
far greater role in managing an efficient and cost-effective discovery process. Not only
must litigants begin to both more effectively cooperate and better adhere to the
proportionality requirement, but also the judiciary—in an effort to ensure the proper
utilization of the FRCP’s tools—must actively intervene to foster discovery’s requisite
cooperation. All litigants must expect the court to assume this role.
A. Predictive Coding
¶25

Predictive coding, or computer-assisted document review, has been at the forefront
of legal technology since early 2012, and offers to substantially mitigate the costs of ESIdiscovery review.61 The producing party’s review of requested ESI for relevance,
responsiveness, and privilege comprises approximately seventy-three percent of ediscovery’s cost.62 Predictive coding demonstrates that just as increased cooperation is
required to utilize technological advances, so is increased judicial intervention.
¶26
Fundamentally, predictive coding is an algorithm-based process that “classifies
documents according to how well they match the concepts and terms in sample

59

See John L. Carroll, Proportionality in Discovery: A Cautionary Tale, 32 CAMPBELL L. REV. 455,
460–64 (2010); Theodore C. Hirt, The Quest for “Proportionality” in Electronic Discovery: Moving from
Theory to Reality in Civil Litigation, 5 FED. CTS. L. REV. 171, 176–78, 187 (2011); Gordon W. Netzorg &
Tobin D. Kern, Proportional Discovery: Making It the Norm, Rather than the Exception, DENV. U. L. REV.
513, 537–42 (2010). The American Bar Association’s most recent survey shows that discovery-producing
parties do not believe courts are protecting them against unreasonably burdensome e-discovery demand.
See ABA REPORT, supra note 56, at 109 (showing that 85.1% of defense attorney and 71.4% of mixedpractice lawyer survey respondents do not believe courts are protecting them against unreasonably
burdensome e-discovery demands).
60
See AM. COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT
OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., FINAL REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL
LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN
LEGAL SYSTEM 2 (2009), available at http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&template=/
CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=4008 (finding that judges currently do not effectively enforce the
proportionality requirement, and need to hold an active, managerial role from a case’s beginning and help
set the scope of a discovery process in order to prevent discovery abuses).
61
Scott Vernick, Predictive Coding: Three Things You Need to Know About this Year’s Biggest Legal
Tech Trend, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 15, 2012, 6:36 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/scottvernick/three-things-you-need-to-_b_1773959.html.
62
NICHOLAS M. PACE & LAURA ZAKARAS, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, WHERE THE MONEY GOES:
UNDERSTANDING LITIGANT EXPENDITURES FOR PRODUCING ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY xiv (2012), available
at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1208.pdf.
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documents.”63 In response to a discovery request, the responding party must first identify
a “seed set”64 from the universe of all searchable ESI, and the parties must agree on the
size of the seed set and how it should be selected.65 Next, the responding party manually
views the seed set, and codes the documents as relevant, responsive, or privileged.66 This
coding directly impacts predictive coding’s effectiveness.67 Then, the computer relies on
probability68 to predict how the rest of the ESI would be coded,69 and produces a sample
of its predictions.70 Before running the process, parties must agree what degree of
inaccuracy, if any, should prompt corrective action. Another iterative round follows if the
sample is determined to be insufficiently accurate.71 Finally, the producing party must
manually review the documents classified as relevant to make sure they only turn over
responsive, non-privileged documents.72
¶27
In February 2012, Judge Andrew Peck of the Southern District of New York held
in Moore v. Publicis Groupe that predictive coding “now can be considered judiciallyapproved for use in appropriate cases.”73 Even so, predictive coding has not reached the
mainstream. A survey taken at the 2012 New York LegalTech Conference found that
although 97% of respondents were familiar with predictive coding, only 31% have
adopted or are considering adopting the technology.74 Respondents felt that concerns
about accuracy, defensibility, cost, privilege/confidentiality rules, and difficulty
understanding the process have prevented predictive coding from going mainstream.75
Predictive coding’s current role in discovery review is uncertain, but whether or not
litigants eventually utilize predictive coding, the mere consideration of its use thrusts
judges into larger managerial roles. Three pivotal predictive-coding cases confirm this
inevitably enhanced role.

63

Id. at xvii.
A seed set is a sample from the universe of discoverable ESI, which informs the computer on the
relevancy of the discoverable ESI.
65
There are various ways to select the seed set, e.g., keyword searching, judgmental sampling, and
statistical sampling. See ROBERT M. ABRAHAMS ET AL., COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN N.Y. STATE COURTS
§ 25:39 (N.Y. Prac. Series 3d ed. 2014).
66
Id.
67
See id. (“[O]ne of the more common concerns with this phase is the ‘garbage-in equals garbage out’
phenomenon and how one may control it . . . a small mistake at the beginning of the process can cause big
problems down the road: for example, there may be many false positives, or, even more troubling, many
relevant documents being missed because of reviewer coding error.”).
68
PACE & ZAKARAS, supra note 62, at xviii.
69
See ABRAHAMS, supra note 65.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Moore v. Publicis Groupe, 287 F.R.D. 182, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) adopted sub nom. Moore v. Publicis
Groupe SA, No. 11 Civ. 1279 (ALC) (AJP), 2012 WL 1446534 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2012).
74
David Snow, Cranking up the Buzz on Info-Governance, Predictive Coding, LAW TECH. NEWS 2 (Feb.
9, 2012), http://www.lawtechnologynews.com/id=1202541708083/Cranking-Up-the-Buzz-onInfoGovernance-Predictive-Coding?slreturn=20140825154650; see Matthew Nelson, Survey Says…
Information Governance and Predictive Coding Adoption Slow, but Likely to Gain Steam as Technology
Improves, E-DISCOVERY 2.0 (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.clearwellsystems.com/e-discoveryblog/2012/02/15/survey-says-information-governance-and-predictive-coding-adoption-slow-but-likely-togain-steam-as-technology-improves/ (noting that of this 31%, only 12% have adopted predictive-coding
technology).
75
Id.
64
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¶28

In Moore, the first action involving predictive coding, Judge Peck played an
enormous role after the parties agreed to utilize predictive-coding technology to review
over three million electronic documents.76 The litigants initiated this discussion free from
judicial intervention.77 However, after agreeing to use predictive coding, the parties
staunchly disagreed about how to employ it.78 It was “easy” for Judge Peck to authorize
predictive coding since each party favored it,79 but he participated substantially in helping
the parties progress towards a use agreement. In the eleven-week period between Judge
Peck’s assignment and his issued opinion, the judge mediated dialogue between the two
parties, played a continuing, active role in setting the coding protocol to be used, held
three status conferences, and handled plaintiff’s objections that defendant’s proposed
coding protocol was unreliable due to a lack of adequate transparency.80 Judge Peck
stressed that predictive coding’s reliability depends on complete transparency between
the parties,81 and rejected plaintiff’s unreliability objections because the defendant agreed
to produce the entire seed set—all relevant and irrelevant documents, except privileged
documents—for plaintiff’s review.82 Judge Peck also faced disputes over nearly 3,300
documents out of more than 15,000 used in the seed set,83 and four recusal motions.84
Even when parties independently agree to use predictive coding, substantial and constant
judicial mediation is required to set and manage the actual review protocol.
¶29
Judges also play a large role when parties disagree about using predictive coding.
In Global Aerospace Inc. v. Landow Aviation, L.P., the defendant requested to use
predictive coding to review eight terabytes of data.85 The plaintiff objected, arguing that
human review is a more effective means of discovery.86 On April 23, 2012, a Virginia
state judge granted the defendant’s request,87 and explicitly assumed the role of arbiter
for any issues that the plaintiff could bring about “the completeness of the contents of the
production or the ongoing use of predictive coding.”88
¶30
Judges may also assume a significant managerial role when predictive coding is not
used, but merely contemplated. In the most recent discussion of predictive coding, Kleen
Products LLC v. Packaging Corp. of America, the plaintiff moved for the court to require

76

See Moore, 287 F.R.D. at 184.
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 189.
80
See id. at 183–89.
81
See id. at 189, 191–92.
82
Id.
83
See Order at 4, Moore v. Publicis Groupe, 287 F.R.D. 182 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2012) (No. 11 Civ. 1279
(ALC) (AJP)).
84
See id. at 6–7; Order, Moore v. Publicis Groupe, 287 F.R.D. 182 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2012) (No. 11 Civ.
1279 (ALC) (AJP)); see also Opinion and Order, Moore v. Publicis Groupe, 287 F.R.D. 182 (June 15,
2012) (No. 11 Civ. 1279 (ALC) (AJP)).
85
Evan Koblentz, Judge Orders Predictive Coding over Plaintiff Objection, LAW TECH. NEWS (Apr. 24,
2012), http://www.lawtechnologynews.com/id=1202550119183?slreturn=20140028164531.
86
Id.
87
Global Aerospace Inc. v. Landow Aviation L.P., No. CL. 61040 (Va. Cir. Ct. Apr. 23, 2012),
available at http://www.crowell.com/files/Global-Aerospace-v-Landow.pdf.
88
Predictive Coding Ordered in Global Aerospace Inc. v. Landow Aviation L.P. dba Dulles Jet Center
et al., SCHNADER, HARRISON, SEGAL & LEWIS LLP (May 3, 2012) (quoting Global Aerospace Inc., No. Cl.
61040), available at http://www.schnader.com/news/xprNewsDetail.aspx?xpST=NewsDetail&news=1129.
77
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the defendant to redo its document production with predictive-coding technology.89 The
plaintiff argued that it was more accurate than the Boolean-keyword-search technology
the defendant employed.90 The plaintiffs made this motion seven months after the initial
discovery request,91 but by this time, defendants had already expended substantial time
and money92 on the production of over three million pages of discovery.93 The next
month, Magistrate Judge Nan Nolan was assigned for discovery supervision. Judge Nolan
spent two full days conducting evidentiary hearings, and held fourteen status hearings
and Rule 16 conferences, many of which lasted an entire day or longer.94 After eight
contentious months, the parties stipulated that they would not use predictive coding, and
would not argue for its use until October 1, 2013.95 In Kleen, parties merely contemplated
using predictive coding, yet the court was again thrust into a constant and active
managerial role.
¶31
It is clear that predictive coding relies on judicial mediation. Without it, predictive
coding would threaten privileged communication and judicial economy, and open the
door for litigants to game the system. In Moore, the passionate debate about what data to
include in the seed set persisted for many months after the litigants set the coding
protocol.96 In Global Aerospace, the court anticipated challenges during and following
the predictive-coding process.97 Moore relied on complete transparency between the two
parties to effectively code and test the process.98 But because discovery often lacks
complete cooperation and transparency between opposing parties, a mediator is required
to ameliorate these issues. For instance:
In addition to potentially having to reveal attorney work product by
explaining why documents were coded a certain way, the mandatory meet
and confer session allows the requesting party to “game” the discovery
89

See Kleen Prods., LLC v. Packaging Corp. of Am., No. 10 C 5711, 2012 WL 4498465, at *3 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 28, 2012).
90
Jan Conlin & Andrew Pieper, Litigation: Predictive Coding’s Grand Debut, INSIDECOUNSEL (Sept.
13, 2012), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/09/13/litigation-predictive-codings-grand-debut.
91
See Kleen Prods., 2012 WL 4498465, at *6–7.
92
See Karl Schieneman, Contrasting Da Silva Moore and Kleen Predictive Coding Cases Part 2,
DOCUMENT REVIEW MD BLOG (Mar. 27, 2012), http://docreviewmd.com/contrasting-da-silva-moore-andkleen-predictive-coding-cases-part-2/L (noting that defendant spent over 30,000 hours of review, and
approximating a financial cost of at least $1.5 million).
93
Bob Ambrogi, Making Sense of “Kleen Products”: Is It Really About Predictive Coding?, CATALYST
(July 11, 2012), http://www.catalystsecure.com/blog/2012/07/making-sense-of-kleen-products-is-it-reallyabout-predictive-coding/.
94
Opinion and Order at 9, Moore v. Publicis Groupe, 287 F.R.D. 182 (June 15, 2012) (No. 11 Civ. 1279
(ALC) (AJP)).
95
Kleen Prods., 2012 WL 4498465, at *11.
96
Moore v. Publicis Groupe, 287 F.R.D. 182, 184–86 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) adopted sub nom. Moore v.
Publicis Groupe SA, No. 11 Civ. 1279 (ALC) (AJP), 2012 WL 1446534 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2012).
97
Global Aerospace Inc. v. Landow Aviation L.P., No. CL. 61040 (Va. Cir. Ct. Apr. 23, 2012),
available at http://www.crowell.com/files/Global-Aerospace-v-Landow.pdf.
98
Moore, 287 F.R.D. at 189; see Establishing an Adequate Search & Why “Custodians [Cannot] be
Trusted to Run Effective Searches of Their Own Files,” K&L GATES (Aug. 3, 2012),
http://www.ediscoverylaw.com/2012/08/articles/case-summaries/establishing-an-adequate-search-whycustodians-cannot-be-trusted-to-run-effective-searches-of-their-own-files/ (affirming that complete
transparency is required by finding that custodians can’t be trusted to run effective searches of their own
files).
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process. It certainly is not beyond the realm of possibility that the
nonproducing party could fabricate challenges for the sole purpose of
extracting confidential information from opposing counsel.99
Further, all three cases demonstrate the incredibly adversarial nature inherent in the
decision of whether to use predictive coding. Some insist that litigants are incentivized to
game the process by coding in a way that makes the most beneficial documents come to
the top of the pile, or by coding in a way that purposefully prevents a computer from
producing a relevant document.100 These potential forms of abuse explain Judge Peck’s
focus on transparency and the active judicial role. Predictive coding, as affirmed by the
Kleen court, requires cooperation and judicial determinations of proportionality. The
courts above explicitly turned to proportionality, and although Kleen emphasized
cooperation,101 all three pairs of litigants were far from such a spirit of cooperation.
Beyond these three cases, predictive coding, as a step towards limiting e-discovery’s
burden, has garnered significant attention in recent years.102
¶32
Additionally, predictive coding harms judicial economy under the current ediscovery landscape. All three judges left the coding’s planning completely up to the
parties, and only mediated issues they raised in the courtroom. Such a reactive approach
is insufficient in this context. Predictive coding is an art, not a complete review, so
litigants who already were not cooperating as the FRCP drafters intended now have an
increased incentive not to cooperate. Enhanced judicial mediation is necessary for
successful predictive coding—a preservation- or sanction-based amendment would not
suffice.
B. Metadata
¶33

Metadata is hidden data that “describes how, when, and by whom an electronic
document was created, modified, and transmitted.”103 In other words, metadata is data
about data, and is attached to every piece of ESI in existence. The FRCP do not directly
address metadata or metadata discoverability.104 As a result, uncertainty surrounds
metadata discovery. The Advisory Committee is considering placing limitations on
99

ABRAHAMS, supra note 65; see Moore, 287 F.R.D. at 189.
See Why Court Approval of Computer-Based Searches Changes Everything, RITTERACADEMY,
http://www.ritteracademy.com/blog/why-court-approval-computer-based-searches-changes-everything (last
visited Nov. 6, 2012).
101
Breaking News: Kleen Products Ruling Confirms Significance of Cooperation and Proportionality in
eDiscovery, E-DISCOVERY 2.0 (Oct. 2, 2012), http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/breaking-newskleen-products-ruling-confirms-significance-cooperation-and-proportionality-edis.
102
See Conlin & Pieper, supra note 90; see, e.g., Nicholas Barry, Man Versus Machine Review: The
Showdown Between Hordes of Discovery Lawyers and a Computer-Utilizing Predictive-Coding
Technology, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 343, 363–73 (2013); Maura R. Grossman & Gordon V. Cormack,
Technology-Assisted Review in E-Discovery Can Be More Effective and More Efficient than Exhaustive
Manual Review, 17 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 11 (2011); see also Andrew Peck, Search, Forward: Will Manual
Document Review and Keyword Searches be Replaced by Computer-Assisting Coding?, LAW TECH. NEWS,
Oct. 2011, at 25–26. Note that Judge Peck presided over Moore v. Publicis Groupe, and this publication
formed the basis for the recusal motions he faced. See Order, Moore v. Publicis Groupe, 287 F.R.D. 182
(S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2012) (No. 11 Civ. 1279 (ALC) (AJP)).
103
Embedded Information in Electronic Documents, LEXISNEXIS, http://www.lexisnexis.com/
applieddiscovery/lawlibrary/whitePapers/ADI_MetaData.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2014).
104
Chad Everingham, Practical E-Discovery Issues, 51 ADVOCATE (TEX.) 37, 37 (2010).
100
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metadata discovery,105 but any change is several years away—no definitive amendments
have yet been enacted, and even upon enactment, “several years or more would be
required before any rules would go into effect, even if [the Advisory Committee meets]
no serious hurdles along the way.”106
¶34
There is no clear standard of discoverability for metadata, and discoverability is a
fact-based inquiry.107 Three issues create this uncertainty. First, courts differ on whether
ESI must be produced in its “native format.”108 ESI in its “native format” carries its
metadata,109 but ESI converted into another file format usually loses its metadata.110
Second, states differ on what metadata is discoverable.111 Third, there are unclear ethical
standards about scrubbing (removing)112 and mining (reviewing produced ESI’s metadata
when not requested) metadata.113
¶35
The FRCP give courts some direction: Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(ii) requires ESI be
produced in “reasonably usable forms.”114 Sedona Principal 12,115 as revised in 2007, has
provided significant guidance,116 and maintains that:
[The choice of whether to produce ESI in its native format should] [take]
into account the need to produce reasonably accessible metadata that will
enable the receiving party to have the same ability to access, search, and

105

Thomas Y. Allman, E-Discovery Standards in Federal and State Courts After the 2006 Federal
Amendments, ELEC. DISCOVERY L. 11 (May 3, 2012), available at http://www.ediscoverylaw.com/files/
2013/11/2012FedStateEDiscoveryRulesMay3.pdf (“Under this proposal, discovery of ESI would not
extend to matter not ‘routinely used by the responding party’ or might list excluded sources and limit the
number of custodians, search terms, time frames and metadata required to be produced.”).
106
Id.; see COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE REPORT, supra note 2, at 192 (noting that any
FRCP amendment cannot go into effect until the end of 2014).
107
See generally Majorie A. Shields, Annotation, Discoverability of Metadata, 29 A.L.R. 6th 167
(2007).
108
See Everingham, supra note 104, at 37–38.
109
Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 547 (D. Md. 2007).
110
See Everingham, supra note 104, at 37.
111
See Allman, supra note 105, at 43.
112
See Shields, supra note 107, § 2 (“In a litigation setting, the issue arises of whether this can be done
without either the agreement of the parties or the producing party providing notice through an objection or
motion for protective order.”).
113
The A.B.A. and states impose widely varying ethical standards for scrubbing and mining. See
Metadata Ethics Opinions Around the U.S., A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/departments_
offices/legal_technology_resources/resources/charts_fyis/metadatachart.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2013).
114
FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(ii).
115
The Sedona Principles are publications of the Sedona Conference, a nonprofit 501(c)(3) nonpartisan
research and educational institute focused on the advancement of law and policy in various areas, including
complex litigation. Frequently Asked Questions, SEDONA CONFERENCE, https://thesedonaconference.org/
faq (last visited Jan. 27, 2013). The Sedona Conference brings together leading legal scholars, and the
Sedona Principles are frequently cited as authority by judges and legal scholars. See SEDONA CONFERENCE
WORKING GRP. ON ELEC. DOCUMENT RETENTION & PROD., THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: SECOND EDITION
BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT
PRODUCTION ii (Jonathan M. Redgrave et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007) [hereinafter THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES],
available at https://thesedonaconference.org/download-pub/81.
116
Aguilar v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 255 F.R.D. 350, 355–56 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
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display the information as the producing party where appropriate or
necessary in light of the nature of the information and needs of the case.117
Aguilar v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, a leading metadata case, noted that
“even if native files are requested, it is sufficient to produce [ESI] in PDF or TIFF format
accompanied by a load file containing searchable text and selected metadata.”118 The
proportionality standard necessarily applies to metadata.119
¶36
Since Aguilar, clear standards of metadata discoverability have surfaced. There is a
general presumption against the production of metadata, but it is rebuttable if the
producing party has or should have reasonable awareness that particular metadata is
relevant to litigation.120 Courts generally require metadata requests be made during the
initial discovery demands and Rule 26(f) conferences.121 Courts will frequently grant
metadata-production requests when made by the requesting party in its initial document
request. Courts will typically deny them when such requests are not included in the initial
request, especially if the ESI was produced in a different format.122 “In sum . . . if a party
wants metadata, it should ‘[a]sk for it. Up front. Otherwise, if the party asks too late or
has already received the document in another form, it may be out of luck.’”123 Like with
predictive coding, proportionality, preparation, and cooperation underlie successful
metadata production.
¶37
Metadata poses a host of threats, which courts have recognized by refusing to grant
metadata requests made after the initial document request. First, metadata review for
privileged information requires huge time and financial commitments—for example,
since metadata tracks all changes made in a document’s lifetime, a large metadata request
can be extremely burdensome. Second, unclear standards of cost shifting and cost
recovery124 could financially cripple a prevailing defendant. Third, a defendant’s
conservative adherence to muddled ethical requirements125 yields overbroad discovery
production and threatens confidentiality. Fourth, courts vary on how much evidentiary
weight to accord metadata.126 Thus, due to the significant costs, metadata requests can
unnecessarily waste judicial and litigant resources. Additionally, metadata can be
inaccurate.127 Metadata requests thus threaten to become costly fishing expeditions.
117

THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 115, at 60.
Aguilar, 255 F.R.D. at 356 (quoting Sedona Principle 12 cmt. 12b, illus. i).
119
See id. at 355 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)).
120
126 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 5 (2012).
121
Id. § 6.
122
See, e.g., Everingham, supra note 104, at 38. For a denial, see Autotech Techs. Ltd. v.
Automationdirect.com, Inc., 248 F.R.D. 556, 560 (N.D. Ill. 2008).
123
Aguilar, 255 F.R.D. at 357 (quoting Adam J. Levitt & Scott J. Ferrell, Taming the Metadata Beast,
239 N.Y.L.J., May 16, 2008, at 4).
124
See Nicholas J. Wagoner, Will E-Discovery Cost Recovery Catch the Supreme Court’s Eye?, CIRCUIT
SPLITS (June 29, 2012, 5:01 AM), http://www.circuitsplits.com/2012/06/yesterdays-post-examined-thecert-petition-recently-filed-in-hoosier-racing-tire-corp-v-race-tires-america-inc-which.html (discussing the
federal circuit split regarding the recoverability of ESI-production costs by a prevailing party).
125
Parties are generally under a duty to preserve metadata until either the 26(f) or initial discovery
conference. Allman, supra note 105, at 14. Ethical standards beyond this point vary widely from state to
state. See id. at 21.
126
Rachel K. Alexander, E-Discovery Practice, Theory, and Precedent: Finding the Right Pond, Lure,
and Lines Without Going on a Fishing Expedition, 56 S.D. L. REV. 25, 36 (2011).
127
See THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 115, at 60.
118
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Courts have generally resolved the issue of metadata discoverability, but these
problematic issues still remain.
¶38
As mentioned above, confidentiality concerns underlie all metadata requests.
Native-format metadata tracks all changes and comments made to a word-processing
document,128 threatening to reveal confidential information. There is a split of authority
on whether inadvertently released privileged information loses its protection.129 Each
computer program’s metadata is unique, and especially in light of anticipated
technological advancements, it is unreasonable to expect perpetually perfect review of
metadata. This uncertainty requires a defendant to tiptoe around metadata-production
requests.
¶39
Metadata embodies e-discovery’s threats. Its production imposes both temporal and
financial burdens, threatens confidentiality, and incentivizes gamesmanship in the
discovery process. Especially because of the varied standards of metadata discoverability,
one thing is clear: metadata production must be carefully managed.
C. Deleted No Longer Means Deleted: Shadow Copies
¶40

Shadow copies are an unexplored threat to e-discovery. Shadow copies (or Volume
Shadow Copy Service) are automatic, read-only screenshots and backup copies of all data
on a computer that create restore points to safeguard against system failure.130 This
includes locked data.131 Each copy only updates itself with the changes made since the
previous save.132 Shadow copies are an example of when technology has surpassed
general knowledge in the legal community, as many remain unaware of their existence.
¶41
Windows 7, Vista Business, Enterprise, and Ultimate editions automatically make
shadow copies.133 Almost half of all computers use these programs worldwide.134
Permanently deleting these shadow copies is highly technical,135 and it may be
impossible to permanently delete some shadow copies.136
128

See David T. Cox, Metadata—What It Reveals Could Cost You, MATTERS OF PRACTICE BLOG (July
25, 2012), http://mattersofpractice.com/blog/metadata-what-it-reveals-could-cost-you/.
129
See ABRAHAMS, supra note 65, § 25:58.
130
See Tomasz P. Szynalski, What You Should Know About Volume Shadow Copy/System Restore in
Windows 7 & Vista (FAQ), TRYING TO BE HELPFUL (Nov. 23, 2009), http://blog.szynalski.com/2009/11/23/
volume-shadow-copy-system-restore/ (discussing shadow copies generally); see also How Volume Shadow
Copy Service Works, WINDOWS SERVER (Mar. 28, 2003), http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/
cc785914%28WS.10%29.aspx (discussing same).
131
See Martin Brinkmann, Copy Locked and Open Files in Windows, GHACKS.NET (Jan. 19, 2009),
http://www.ghacks.net/2009/01/19/copy-locked-and-open-files-in-windows/ (noting shadow copies retain
locked files); see also Backup/Copy Files that Are “In Use” or “Locked” in Windows, HOW-TO GEEK
(Mar. 9, 2008), http://www.howtogeek.com/howto/windows-vista/backupcopy-files-that-are-in-use-orlocked-in-windows/ (noting same).
132
Craig Ball, The Shadow Knows, BALL IN YOUR COURT (Sept. 24, 2011), http://ballinyourcourt.word
press.com/2011/09/24/the-shadow-knows/.
133
See MICROSOFT CORP., Selected Scenarios for Maintaining Data Integrity with Windows Vista,
TECHNET, http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc749185.aspx (last visited Mar. 1, 2013) (noting that
Windows Vista automatically stores complete shadow copies daily, or more frequently if manually
triggered).
134
Ball, supra note 132.
135
See James Burrage, Comment to Where’s My Disk Space?, MICROSOFT ENTERPRISE PLATFORMS
SUPPORT (Apr. 13, 2011, 4:23 AM), http://blogs.technet.com/b/askcore/archive/2011/04/13/where-s-mydisk-space.aspx (discussing deletion process). There is very limited control over deleting shadow copies.
See How to Free up Drive Space by Removing Shadow Copies [Windows], MAKE TECH EASIER (Oct. 22,
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Apple’s analogous program, Time Machine, databases shadow copies on an hourly
basis. Although users must manually setup Time Machine, Apple computers prompt
unwitting users to install the product the first time users turn on their computers. The
natural inclination to conveniently back-up one’s data has rendered Time Machine use
standard operating procedure for many Apple customers.138
¶43
By taking regular snapshots of personal data, these programs not only create
system-restore points—they track user work product.139 These Volume Shadow Copying
Services preserve ESI that a technologically competent user thinks is deleted, wiped, or
encrypted, but does not prevent a digital-forensic expert from gaining easy access.140
Permanently deleting data can prove to be a sophisticated process that is unknown to the
majority of consumers.
¶44
E-mail services illuminate this paradox between the difficulties of data deletion and
the ease of data recovery. Microsoft Exchange allows very easy recovery of doubledeleted e-mails, which is when a user deletes an e-mail from its inbox and then purges the
e-mail from the Deleted Items folder.141 “Deleted” confidential documents are readily
accessible to a forensics expert—in fact, deleted and purged data remain only three clicks
away for such an expert.142 Still, users rely on these services, as they provide a system
restore vital to cure technical problems.143
¶45
No courts have confronted the issue of shadow copies, but it is only a matter of
time before the judiciary must do so. Since shadow copies create a complete history of a
computer’s entire life,144 litigants will seek their discovery, especially when there is a
137

2011), http://maketecheasier.com/free-up-drive-space-by-removing-shadow-copies/2011/10/22 (noting that
there are only two ways for a user to delete shadow copies—either by purging and deleting all of them, or
by deleting the oldest shadow copy).
136
See Szynalski, supra note 130 (noting that there is no way to delete a file from all shadow copies, and
that nontechnical deletion attempts that do not wipe clean the disk space will be unsuccessful because
deleted shadow copies’ content still exist in the same space); see also Bruce Schneier, The Security
Implications of Windows Volume Shadow Copy, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (Dec. 22, 2009),
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2009/12/the_security_im.html (noting that if a shadow copy is
made and a restore point created, the shadow copy cannot be deleted).
137
Tom Nelson, Time Machine Review: Review of Apple’s Time Machine Backup Software,
ABOUT.COM, http://macs.about.com/od/backupsoftware/gr/time-machine-review.htm (last visited Jan. 27,
2013).
138
See id. (“Using Time Machine as your primary backup is a no-brainer.”). It is far simpler to delete
shadow copies from Time Machine than from Windows programs. See Mac Basics: Time Machine Backs
up Your Mac, APPLE, http://support.apple.com/kb/ht1427 (last visited Mar. 1, 2013) (describing the process
to manually delete backups directly on the Time Machine interface). Even for Time Machine users, though,
manually reviewing and deleting unneeded shadow copies when litigation is anticipated would be
enormously burdensome. Additionally, regular deletion is impractical because parties will often want to
preserve confidential work–product backups.
139
See Ball, supra note 132.
140
See id.
141
Craig Ball, A Changing Definition of Deletion, BALL IN YOUR COURT (Sept. 30, 2011),
http://ballinyourcourt.wordpress.com/2011/09/30/a-changing-definition-of-deletion/.
142
See Ball, supra note 132.
143
Jeff Beard, More on Vista Shadow Copies & the Dreaded Index.dat Files, LAWTECH GURU BLOG
(July 26, 2007), http://www.lawtechguru.com/archives/2007/07/26_more_on_vista_shadow_copies_
the_dreaded_indexdat_files.html.
144
Note that this is limited by storage space. See Szynalski, supra note 130 (further noting that and
describing how shadow-copy storage is incredibly efficient); Windows Vista and Volume Shadow Copies,
PIRIFORM, http://www.piriform.com/docs/defraggler/technical-information/windows-vista-and-volume-
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question of metadata reliability. Currently, the Aguilar analysis of e-mail restoration and
proportionality may well extend to shadow copies.145 Since the final document is
producible, review of all shadow copies and work product will contribute to both
temporal and financial burdens. Further, it is likely that this review would be of limited
probative value. But just like metadata, there are times when shadow-copy production
will be necessary.
¶46
Shadow copies create predictable threats in the e-discovery context. Shadow copies
trace work product more thoroughly than metadata, which can be controlled by disabling
track changes on documents. Shadow copies thus threaten confidentiality to a greater
extent than metadata.146 Additionally, the burden of shadow-copy review eclipses that of
metadata review. Shadow copies regularly freeze a computer at a point in time, and single
documents cannot be reviewed or deleted, but rather a complete restore point—and all
data it holds—must be deleted.
¶47
In addition, computer-forensics experts are commonly needed to simplify a
computer’s data for the court.147 These experts often make a complete mirror image of a
computer’s hard drive.148 On top of the increased time and cost of paying forensics
experts, employing these experts in the discovery process will require a substantial time
investment—the experts will need constant supervision to prevent the release of
privileged ESI. Compared to metadata, shadow copies present greater room for error and
a higher likelihood of unintentionally waived privilege. Just as it took years for a rough
standard for metadata discoverability to surface, shadow copies will similarly harm
judicial economy. In sum, shadow copies will present similar, but amplified, threats to
those presented by metadata. Shadow copies also add the burden of managing a forensics
expert. The production of shadow copies as e-discovery will thus require careful
management.
IV. LESSONS LEARNED: A PROPOSED AMENDMENT
¶48

The three above issues surrounding ESI discoverability all demonstrate that
enhanced and earlier judicial intervention is needed for a more efficient and effective
discovery practice. The available and potentially discoverable ESI forms will continue to
shadow-copies (last visited Mar. 1, 2013).
145
Aguilar v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 255 F.R.D. 350, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“Moreover,
the Plaintiffs have not shown that there is a likelihood of recovering important information not previously
disclosed. Accordingly, because the cost of this additional discovery is unquestionably high and the likely
benefit low, the Defendants will not be required to review and produce any data regarding emails in ICE's
back-up tapes.”).
146
For a mistake of an expert, see Expert’s Inadvertent Production Results in Waiver of Privilege Absent
Sufficient Supervision by Counsel or Prompt Steps to Rectify Disclosure, K&L GATES (May 24, 2012),
http://www.ediscoverylaw.com/2012/05/articles/case-summaries/experts-inadvertent-production-results-inwaiver-of-privilege-absent-sufficient-supervision-by-counsel-or-prompt-steps-to-rectify-disclosure/.
147
See John H. Jessen et al., Digital Discovery, 1001 MASS. EXPERT WITNESSES § 10.1 (2013).
148
See Jenna M. Bedsole & John Mallery, Controlling Costs in E-Discovery, 72 ALA. LAWYER 134, 139
(2011); Sean L. Harrington, Collaborating with a Digital Forensics Expert: Ultimate Tag-Team or
Disastrous Duo?, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 353, 373 (2011); Franz J. Vancura, Using Computer
Forensics to Enhance the Discovery of Electronically Stored Information, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 727, 728–
29 (2010).
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evolve at a quicker rate than the legal community’s ability to adapt with clear rules. The
need for judicial mediation to manage the increasingly complex e-discovery process will
continue to correspond with increasing uncertainty.
These developments reveal two very relevant truths about modern e-discovery.
First, judicial intervention is required to attain discovery’s goals. Technological advances
will undercut predictability and continue to bring protracted, contentious litigation by
constantly changing the e-discovery landscape. Second, the current reactive approach to
new developments in e-discovery diverges from the fundamental cooperative purposes of
discovery.
To accommodate these two realities, the Rule 26(f) discovery conference should be
amended. To initiate the discovery process after complaint filing, the plaintiff should be
required to submit a 26(f) conference agenda to the court for approval, and then to the
defendant. This agenda will propose a complete discovery plan and schedule,149 and the
court will oversee the conference to ensure the parties adhere to the agenda. In turn,
parties will be bound to the agenda’s terms. Practically, as discovery often reveals the
existence of additional, potentially relevant information, courts can circumstantially
apply the proportionality and good-faith standards to specific requests.150 This new
managerial judicial role will help foster cooperation among the parties throughout the
discovery process. Also, judges will gain the firsthand knowledge necessary to
appropriately apply the proportionality standard. Judges will learn through experience
what requests are overly burdensome and will be in the best position to streamline the
discovery process. Ideally, judges can establish standards to promote early resolution of
disputes, managing parties’ expectations for precisely how the discovery process unfolds.
The current reactionary approach to curing e-discovery’s problems fails because
new ESI forms and data-production methods are constantly surfacing, each bringing
unique challenges. It is difficult to efficiently or effectively solve each of e-discovery’s
problems in a vacuum. The Advisory Committee must move past this micro-approach to
change and recognize modern e-discovery’s large-scale failures. When the FRCP are
finally amended, a more active role for judges would give attorneys much-needed peace
of mind by offering clarity on how the discovery process will develop.
Bringing the court in at the Rule 26(f) conference will mitigate future threats,
which are currently unforeseeable because of uncertainty in how this technology will
evolve. It is practically impossible for parties to flawlessly manage ESI because
technological advancements will continue to create new and unique ESI forms. There
will be no guidance on the legal preservation duty for these ESI forms. Active judicial
149

The current Rule 26(f) generally sets the scope for a discovery plan’s content. Although the question
of whether Rule 26(f) should be amended to include specific, e-discovery related requirements is a separate
project, the Sedona Conference’s nonexclusive recommendations for discussion topics should serve as
guidance for specific issues that parties should confront at the discovery conference. Of course, the
presiding judge must approve the discovery plan, so this additional amendment may be unnecessary. See
Cowper & Rosenthal, supra note 13, at 264–67 (contending that parties should discuss (1) data
preservation, including date range, custodians, systems, categories and types of ESI, and search terms; (2)
accessibility of data; (3) production, including scope of production, production format; (4) inadvertent
disclosure of privileged material; (5) database/application discovery; (6) timing of production; (7) cost
shifting; and (8) any open issues).
150
Because judges now play a role in the 26(f) conference, this change fosters cooperation and open
communication, thus parties will be on the same page. So after a successful discovery conference, only a
limited number of additional discovery motions—only when necessary—will be filed.
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intervention, then, is necessary; no judicial post hoc reasonableness evaluation will limit
breaches of the preservation duty or other discovery abuses. The best result that ediscovery would permit is managed party expectations, overcoming the unpredictability
and inconsistency that pervades today’s e-discovery practice. The amendment proposed
by this Comment would accomplish precisely this.
¶53
This amendment would increase accountability, turning predictive coding into a
tool rather than an obstacle. Litigants would be able to accurately anticipate the course of
litigation by preparing for the 26(f) conference, which limits preservation issues. This
would also mitigate today’s looming threat of expansive litigation, high costs, and
disputes over non-dispositive—or fruitless—issues. For example, the Moore plaintiff
would have likely agreed to the defendant’s completely transparent actions in coding the
seed set during the 26(f) conference, well before it faced a non-ideal opinion. This would
have prevented months of active litigation.
¶54
The upshot of this change is not limited to mitigating the issues that arise from
predictive coding, metadata, and shadow-copy production. Consideration of a modern
federal circuit split ripe for Supreme Court review151 reveals that this amendment may
mitigate the gamut of e-discovery’s issues. This proposal is, at the least, markedly more
promising than the other contemplated changes.
V. APPLYING PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO A FEDERAL CIRCUIT SPLIT
¶55

Although the above discussion of modern e-discovery issues is far from a
comprehensive review, a clear pattern of threats that technological advances pose has
emerged. New e-discovery wrinkles force us to take a step back and return to discovery’s
roots. Discovery practice relies on cooperation, but courts cannot leave parties to
independently manage the discovery process. The proposed Rule 26(f) amendment
bolsters cooperation, gives judges a framework within which to apply the now-nebulous
proportionality standard, and reinforces litigants’ accountability to the discovery process.
But this amendment is not merely forward-looking; federal circuits are currently split
over what ESI-production costs are recoverable. An enhanced Rule 26(f) conference
would dull this salient and pressing issue.
¶56
This split stems from how to interpret 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4), the federal taxation of
costs statute (Costs Statute) against FRCP Rule 54. Rule 54(d)(1) provides that “[u]nless
a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs—other than
attorney’s fees—should be allowed to the prevailing party.”152 The Costs Statute states
that a court may tax “[f]ees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any
materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case” as costs.153
Circuits differ as to the proper interpretation of “necessary,” and the only guidance for
litigants is that consultant or vendor fees are likely not entirely taxable.154

151
See Wagoner, supra note 124 (discussing circuit court split and the opportunity for Supreme Court
review).
152
FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(1).
153
28 U.S.C. § 1920(4).
154
Don Zupanec, Remedies, 27 No. 5 FED. LITIGATOR 13 (2012).
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¶57

This issue has very real effects on litigants’ primary actions because this
uncertainty extends to large sums of money.155 Parties must be able to anticipate what
costs will be recoverable in order to avoid Pyrrhic victories, to set a reasonable and
effective plan for the discovery process, and to promote focused e-discovery requests. If
parties could anticipate these costs, this would promote early cooperation and/or a focus
on proportional discovery requests, which would reduce e-discovery’s scope and
burden.156 This Comment does not analyze how the split should be resolved; rather, it
demonstrates how the enhanced 26(f) conference would mitigate the burden and threats it
presents.
¶58
The Federal, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits interpreted the Costs Statute broadly,
allowing a prevailing party to recover costs reasonably incurred in response to a
discovery request.157 Most recently, though, the Third Circuit in Race Tires America, Inc.
v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp. overruled the district court and took a narrow stance. This
court only permitted recovery for scanning and native-file conversion costs, and denied
recovery for an e-vendor’s costs for data collection, metadata preservation, keyword
searching, culling, and production.158 In other words, the Third Circuit held that the
producing party could only recover for costs directly related to “copying.”159 On October
1, 2012, the Supreme Court denied certiorari to the Race Tires appeal.160
¶59
This split is dangerous because parties cannot adequately prepare for or anticipate
the course of litigation. The 26(f) amendment proposed in this Comment would fix this
by ensuring transparency between parties and the court. Once initial discovery requests
are made and the discovery schedule is set, should parties not wish to independently
agree on cost shifting, the court, in its new active role, can inform the parties what the
standards for cost recoverability would be for production responses to particularized
requests.
¶60
This active role would be crucially fluid—the nonstop, unpredictable technological
advancements that define modern society render any efforts to predict future hiccups in
ESI discoverability futile. This new judicial role would further justice for litigants, and
promote both expediency and judicial economy by suppressing unnecessary litigation at
the substantive end of an action on the proper standard for cost recoverability.
Additionally, by bringing the court in before any discovery is produced, the enhanced
proportionality requirement would keep discovery abuses in check. As a failsafe, the
responding party can move for cost shifting under a protective order at discovery’s outset.
Even though the Supreme Court denied certiorari on this issue, this amendment would
ensure that litigants would not be blindsided.
155

See Race Tires Am., Inc., v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 674 F.3d 158, 160 (3d Cir. 2012) (awarding
more than $265,000 in costs); see also In re Ricoh Co., Patent Litig., No. C 03-02289 JW, 2012 WL
1499191, at *6 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (concerning over $675,000); Hecker v. Deere, 556 F.3d 575, 591 (7th Cir.
2009) (awarding parties more than $219,000 for costs).
156
Carey Busen, Third Circuit Limits Taxable eDiscovery Costs, DISCOVERY ADVOCATE (Mar. 23,
2012), http://www.discoveryadvocate.com/2012/03/23/third-circuit-limits-taxable-ediscovery-costs/#more170.
157
In re Ricoh Co., 661 F.3d at 1365 (holding all reasonable “costs of producing a document
electronically” are recoverable); Rundus v. City of Dall, 634 F.3d 309 (5th Cir. 2011) (affirming same in an
appropriate response to a discovery request); Hecker, 556 F.3d 575 (affirming same).
158
See Race Tires, 674 F.3d at 170.
159
See id.
160
Id., cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 233 (2012).
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VI. CONCLUSION
¶61

This proposed Rule 26(f) amendment is the most effective response to ediscovery’s crippling threats and uncertainties because it mitigates both the known and
unknown issues in e-discovery. These threats are not overstated—over the past few years,
they have spawned extensive scholarship and formal discussions to amend the FRCP. But
looking forward, these efforts offer no continued fix. They are reactionary and offer only
a series of temporary solutions, while ignoring the reality that the problems and
difficulties with e-discovery are unique to each ESI form and production technique. This
approach is antiquated. E-discovery continues to evolve, and new preservation/sanctions
issues will inevitably surface almost immediately upon a reactionary fix. When
considering predictive coding, metadata, and shadow copies, it is clear that e-discovery
advancements require immense judicial management. The discovery process can no
longer function free from judicial intervention and it is time to embrace this reality.
¶62
By making the judge an active participant in the 26(f) conference, this amendment
would be both forward- and backward-looking. It acknowledges that e-discovery is here
to stay, that unique issues will perpetually resurface, and that there is no universal fix to
the e-discovery system. From the inception of a legal action, parties would know, e.g.,
precisely what their preservation duty would be, what ESI would be discoverable, how it
would be produced, and what production costs would be recoverable. This solution not
only mitigates the threats presented by e-discovery, but it also, finally, brings a
cooperative spirit to the discovery process.
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